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ABSTRACT 
PRICE BUNDLING IN ONLINE TRAVEL MARKETS: AN EXPLORATORY 
STUDY 
 
SEPTEMBER 2007 
 
JINHOO KIM, B.A., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
 
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor David C. Bojanic 
 
 
Price bundling, offering two or more separate products/services together in a 
single package at a different price from the sum of the components’ prices, is one of the 
most prevalent marketing practices in many industries, including hospitality and travel. 
Virtually all types of firms in the hospitality and travel industry, from suppliers such as 
hotels and airlines to intermediaries such as travel agents, are encouraging customers to 
purchase travel “packages” rather than a single component of travel.  
The purpose of this study is to determine whether the practice of price bundling 
by online travel agents is associated with actual monetary savings to consumers. 
Conventional economics theories generally assume that price bundling results in 
consumer savings in comparison with purchasing the same component products 
separately, and this is what travel agents are highlighting in their advertisements for 
selling travel packages. This study also investigated whether the magnitude of bundle 
discounts vary by four relevant variables such as travel agent, destination city, hotel 
class, and the timing of purchase.  
 v
 The results show that purchasing a travel bundle results in significantly lower 
consumer prices than purchasing the component products separately.  However, the 
magnitude of the bundle savings is inconsistent across the relevant variables.  In 
particular, Travelocity tends to offer significantly greater bundle savings than Expedia; 
bundles including upper-class hotels appear to provide greater absolute discounts than 
lower-class-hotel bundles, but those two are not significantly different in terms of 
percentage discounts.  Some important implications of the results are discussed, along 
with the limitations of the study and suggestions for future research.   
 vi
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Price bundling, offering two or more separate products/services together in a 
single package at a different price from the sum of the components’ prices, is one of the 
most prevalent marketing practices in many industries.  The following examples show 
that bundling is implemented in a wide variety of forms, in almost all kinds of markets.  
 Many telecommunication and cable companies offer 
bundling of different products/services usually at a special 
discount price.  For example, Comcast is offering several 
combinations of its services (i.e., internet access, phone, 
and cable) as a single bundle.  
 Bundling is also common in the restaurant industry.  Most 
restaurants provide “set menus” that bundle several 
complementary menu items (e.g., appetizer, entrée, dessert, 
and beverage) at discounted prices.  McDonald’s various 
“Value Meals” are good examples of bundling, and 
although it may seem less straightforward, buffet meal is 
also one form of bundling.   
 In the software industry, Microsoft’s MS Office, which 
contains several different software titles (e.g., Word, Excel, 
PowerPoint, Access, etc.) in a package, is a typical form of 
bundling.  The company also infamously monopolized the 
Web-browser market by bundling its less attractive Internet 
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 Explorer with its dominant operating system, MS Windows.  
As Stremersch and Tellis (2002) points out, the landmark 
antitrust case against Microsoft was, at the core, a case 
against this bundling of Windows 95 and the Internet 
Explorer.   
 The digitized music industry provides another example of 
bundling.  Downloading an entire music album, a bundle of 
several singles, is usually cheaper than downloading the 
included singles separately.   
The travel industry is not exempt from the extensive use of bundling strategies.  
Virtually all types of firms in the industry, from suppliers such as hotels and airlines to 
intermediaries such as travel agents, are encouraging customers to purchase travel 
“packages” rather than a single component of travel.  For example, the top three pure-
play online travel agents based on the number of bookings for 2004 (i.e., Expedia, 
Travelocity, and Orbitz) advertise that consumers can obtain significant savings by 
booking more than one component of travel together compared with booking the same 
components separately.   
The prevalence of bundling suggests that this practice is of benefit to consumers 
as well as firms.  As to the bundling of travel products, given the advertisements of the 
online travel agents, the “price discount” seems to be the most significant benefit 
consumers can realize through choosing bundles.  For a couple of reasons, however, 
figuring out the savings amounts of bundled travel packages is not as simple and clear 
as calculating the savings of McDonald’s Value Meals.   
 2 
 
 First, travel by its nature consists of many different components (e.g., flights, 
hotel stays, car rentals, activities, etc.), and each of the components also has a number 
of unique attributes that affect its prices.  As a consequence, the savings amounts of a 
travel package, if any, can vary whenever consumers modify its components.  
Moreover, most travel products are usually distributed through different channels, and 
the travel industry suppliers are renowned for implementing dynamic pricing strategies.  
Hence, even if a consumer confirms that booking a package is cheaper than booking the 
components separately within a travel agent’s website, it may not be cheaper compared 
with the same offerings from other intermediaries or suppliers.  Although the Internet 
has continuously reduced search costs, comparing and evaluating all these alternatives 
still require a noticeable amount of time and effort of consumers.   
In this context, this paper attempts to examine whether booking travel 
“packages” at online travel agents’ websites indeed results in “savings,” compared with 
booking the same components separately either within the same websites or at the 
component suppliers’ websites.  In addition, the study is designed to investigate 
whether the saving effect of bundling varies depending on such variables as destination 
city, hotel class (i.e., segment), and the timing of booking (i.e., how far in advance a 
travel product is booked).   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical 
literature on price bundling and identifies the forms of and rationales for the price 
bundling strategies currently implemented by online travel agents.  Chapter 3 defines 
the research questions to be examined in this paper, and presents the methods for 
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collecting and analyzing data.  Chapter 4 presents the results and Chapter 5 discusses 
their implications with some limitations of this paper.  
 CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Forms of Price Bundling 
Following the classification of Adams and Yellen (1976), price bundling may 
occur in one of three strategic forms: pure components, pure bundling, and mixed 
bundling strategies.  Pure components strategy, also known as unbundling 
(Schmalensee, 1984; Stremersch and Tellis, 2002) or separate pricing (Simon and 
Wuebker, 1999), simply refers to selling products only separately.  Pure bundling, 
sometimes called tie-in sales (Guiltinan, 1987), refers to selling the products only in 
package form.  In this case, the products are available only in the bundled form, and 
cannot be purchased separately.  Mixed bundling refers to a strategy in which a firm 
offers its products separately as well as a bundle.  Guiltinan (1987) further classifies 
mixed bundling into two forms: mixed-leader bundling and mixed-joint bundling.  In 
mixed-leader bundling, the price for one product in a bundle is discounted only when 
the other product (i.e., leading product) is purchased at its regular price.  The mixed-
joint bundling, in contrast, sets a discounted price for the bundle itself, not for an 
individual product in the bundle.   
The top three pure-play online travel agents, without exception, are employing 
the mixed-joint bundling.  On these websites, consumers can choose all available travel 
products (e.g., flights, hotels, car rentals, activities, etc.) either separately or as a 
bundle.  Moreover, when consumers choose several travel products together as a 
bundle, the new discounted price is set for the bundle, rather than for each component in 
the bundle.  Such prevalence and homogeneity of the bundling strategies employed by 
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 the online travel agents naturally evoke some questions.  What benefits of price 
bundling make it so popular?  Why do the firms use the same form of price bundling: is 
the mixed-joint bundling superior to the other alternatives, that is, mixed-leader or pure 
bundling?  The next two sections seek to answers these questions.   
Rationales Behind Price Bundling 
Leverage Theory 
The earliest explanation for bundling was developed by the U.S. courts through 
a long line of cases mostly under the antitrust laws (Whinston, 1990).  Often called 
“leverage theory” (e.g., Carbajo, de Meza, and Seidmann, 1990; Whinston, 1990), this 
perspective regards pure-bundling as a device for a firm to profitably extend its 
monopoly power from one market to another.  Whinston (1990) articulates this idea as 
follows: “Tying provides a mechanism whereby a firm with monopoly power in one 
market can use the leverage provided by its power to foreclose sales in, and thereby 
monopolize, a second market” (p. 837).   
Because leverage theory focuses entirely on the pure bundling of a monopolist, 
it cannot appropriately explain the online travel agents’ motivations for price bundling.  
First of all, pure bundling is far less common than mixed bundling in the online travel 
market.  In addition, it is apparent that even the leading online travel agent—according 
to PhoCusWright, Expedia held the largest share with 41.2% of the online travel 
market, based on the number of bookings for 2004 (Mintel Report: Internet Travel 
Booking, U.S., September 2005)—does not have sufficient monopoly power over any 
product it sells.  Consumers can usually book most travel products through numerous 
sellers such as other online agents, brick-and-mortar agents, Internet portals, or the 
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 suppliers.  Hence, this paper does not discuss the leverage theory further, and 
concentrates on several more relevant motivations of online travel agents for price 
bundling: cost and demand side incentives.   
Cost Associated Benefits 
Many observers note that bundling can generate cost savings in production, 
distribution, or transactions (e.g., Adams and Yellen, 1976; Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 
1999; Eppen, Hanson, and Martin 1991; Guiltinan, 1987; Jeuland, 1984; Stremersch 
and Tellis, 2002).  The discussions in this regard, though, are often limited and 
informal, inconsistent in the use of terms, or sometimes not pertinent to the price 
bundling itself.1  Nevertheless, most literature seems to base its explanations, explicitly 
or implicitly, on the concept of “economies of scope.”  Panzar and Willig (1981) define 
the term “economies of scope” as a property of production in which “it is less costly to 
combine two or more product lines in one firm than to produce them separately.”  They 
ascribe these cost reductions to the presence of sharable inputs, which once prepared for 
the production of one output, would be also usable for the production of other products.  
If the costs of utilizing the sharable inputs for the production of more than one product 
are subadditive (i.e., less than the total costs of utilizing the same inputs separately for 
the individual production of the same outputs), firms have strong incentive to realize 
cost savings by jointly producing or offering the products (Panzar and Willig, 1981).  
With price bundling, the firms can set appropriate prices for bundles, thereby 
encouraging consumers to purchase the bundles, which are the cheapest to produce, 
instead of individual products (Hanson and Martin, 1990).   
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 Although online travel agents, as intermediaries, do not indeed “produce” most 
products they sell, this cost-associated explanation provides valuable insight to the 
understanding of their bundling behavior.  As Guiltinan (1987) describes, service 
businesses tend to have a high degree of cost sharing, and the demands for the services 
offered by a firm are generally interdependent; online travel agents are not exempt from 
these characteristics.  For example, once a consumer decides to book a round-trip flight 
through an online travel agent, encouraging the consumer to book hotel accommodation 
as well would be less costly than marketing the same hotel to another potential 
consumer (i.e., interdependence in demand).  In addition, the marginal costs of 
providing “additional” products to the customer would be generally lower than the 
marginal costs of providing the “initial” product (e.g., in terms of processing customers’ 
inquiries, requests, or complaints); that is, there exist subadditive costs.  Therefore, 
selling different travel products together as a bundle is an effective way for online travel 
agents to reduce both marketing and operational costs.   
This paper finds another quasi-cost-side rationale which results from the 
strategic motivation of travel product suppliers.  The perishability of their products 
makes it difficult for service businesses to synchronize supply and demand (Zeithaml, 
Parasuraman, and Berry, 1985).  In the travel industry, for example, hotel rooms and 
airline seats not sold today cannot be inventoried or saved for future sales.  
Furthermore, like online travel agents, travel suppliers also have high fixed-to-variable 
costs ratios.  These two features together result in an incentive for the suppliers to sell 
off the unsold rooms or seats, even at heavily discounted prices.  At the same time, they 
may not want consumers to know about these unusually low prices because such 
 8 
 
 inconsistent pricing could negatively affect consumer perceptions of the price and 
quality, and in turn, the value of discounted products.  If all these assumptions hold 
true, it is persuasive to hypothesize that many travel suppliers provide their products to 
the agents at lower than regular rates, attaching a condition that such discounts are 
eligible exclusively for the products sold as a bundle with different types of travel 
products.  In fact, several practitioners in the hotel industry have recently mentioned in 
a conference that they use travel agents’ bundling as a “device to sell off distressed 
inventory while protecting brand value and maintaining an opaque price” (Garrow, 
Ferguson, Keskinocak, and Swann, 2006).  From the agents’ perspectives, bundling can 
in fact “lower” the costs of the products, thereby providing the opportunity to achieve 
more profits from the same products.  
In summary, these cost-associated approaches show that online travel agents can 
reduce costs through bundling, and thereby achieve greater profits from the same 
products.  Such cost savings through bundling stem in large part from two major 
sources: (1) economies of scope and (2) travel suppliers’ motivation to discount unsold 
products without undermining consumer perceptions of the price and value of 
discounted products.   
However, cost-side approaches have a couple of problems.  First, it is still 
ambiguous which form of bundling, pure or mixed bundling, is more effective in 
pricing products or services.  After all, the amounts of cost savings from bundling, 
whether they are due to economies of scope or the strategic motivation of suppliers, do 
not vary much between these two forms of bundling (Stremersch and Tellis, 2002).  
Second, while bundling indeed lowers online travel agents’ costs, it does not necessarily 
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 lead to the conclusion that the price for a bundle is significantly lower than the sum of 
prices for the individual products in the bundle.  That is, for some reason, online travel 
agents might not pass on those cost savings entirely to the prices of bundles (e.g., 
bundling may provide consumers with greater convenience and savings in transaction 
costs; these benefits may lead to increases in the bundle prices).  These issues are 
addressed in the following sections.  
Demand Associated Benefits 
A large portion of the economics and marketing literature has focused on the 
demand-side benefits of bundling, the benefits resulting from consumer heterogeneity in 
the valuations of the same products.  Using rigorous models or stylized examples, this 
line of research demonstrates that bundling can sort customers into groups with 
different reservation prices (i.e., the maximum price a buyer is willing to pay for a 
product) and thereby enable firms to extract greater consumer surplus (i.e., the amount 
by which the individual’s reservation price exceeds the actual price paid) from the same 
products.  The following hypothetical example using travel products illustrates this 
benefit of bundling clearly.   
Suppose that an online travel agent sells air flights and hotel accommodations.  
Suppose further that there are three consumers and their reservation prices for a round-
trip air flight, the same nights of hotel stay, and the bundle (i.e., flight + hotel stay) are 
revealed as in Table 1.   
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 Table 1: Reservation Price for Air Flight, Hotel, and the Bundle 
 
Reservation Prices ($) Consumer Flight Hotel Bundle 
1 1,000 250 1,250 
2 800 400 1,200 
3 300 700 1,000 
 This example is slightly adapted from those in Stigler (1963), Guiltinan (1987), 
Tellis (1986), and Simon and Wuebker (1999).  
 
If the online travel agent uses an unbundling strategy (i.e., price the two 
products separately), he will set $800 for the flight and $400 for the hotel, hence 
receiving $1,600 from the sale of flight and $800 from the sale of hotel.  The total 
received will be $2,400, which is the maximum achievable amount under the given 
consumer reservation prices, with consumer 1 buying only a flight, consumer 2 buying 
both, and consumer 3 buying only a hotel stay.   
With pure bundling, the agent will set $1,000 for the bundle.  All consumers will 
buy the bundle for $1,000, because the price is either equal to (e.g., for consumer 1), or 
smaller than (e.g., for consumers 2 and 3) their reservation prices.  The agent’s total 
maximum revenue will increase to $3,000, which is 25% higher than the revenue 
achieved with the unbundling strategy.  
If mixed bundling is available, the travel agent will set $800 for the flight, $700 
for the hotel, and $1,200 for the bundle (i.e., 20% discount).  Under these prices, 
consumers 1 and 2 both buy the bundle and consumer 3 buys only a hotel stay.  The 
travel agent’s total revenue further increases to $3,100, which is even 3.3% greater than 
the amount achievable with pure bundling strategy.   
 
 11 
 
 As stated earlier, these revenue increases come from the more effective 
extraction of consumer surplus.  Table 2 shows how the consumer surplus in this 
example becomes smaller as the travel agent employs pure bundling and mixed 
bundling strategies.  Consumers can enjoy a total of $500 of consumer surplus with 
unbundling (i.e., separate pricing).  This amount decreases to $450 if the travel agent 
adopts pure bundling strategy, and decreases even further to $50 with the introduction 
of mixed bundling strategy.   
Table 2: Consumer Surplus Under Unbundling, Pure Bundling, and Mixed 
Bundling 
 
 Unbundling Pure Bundling Mixed Bundling 
Prices ($) PF = 800 PH = 400 
PB = 1,000 
PF = 800, PH = 700 
PB = 1,200 
Consumer Surplus from: Flight Hotel Bundle Flight Hotel Bundle 
Consumer 1 200 N/A 250 N/A N/A 50 
Consumer 2 0 0 200 N/A N/A 0 
Consumer 3 N/A 300 0 N/A 0 N/A 
 Consumer Surplus ($) = Reservation Price – Price 
 PF, PH, and PB represent the prices of flight, hotel, and the flight + hotel bundle.  
 N/A represents a consumer does not purchase the product since its price exceeds her 
reservation price.  In contrast, 0 (zero) means that a consumer actually purchases the 
product, but cannot enjoy any positive consumer surplus because the price she pays 
is equal to her reservation price.   
 
This simple example indicates that bundling has an ability to generate greater 
revenue than unbundling, and furthermore, mixed bundling may work better than pure 
bundling in increasing revenues.  However, it should be noted that this example holds 
true only under a number of strict assumptions on consumer reservation prices, market 
competition, costs, the number of products, etc., hence it is rather difficult to apply this 
example to more general situations.  Indeed, most bundling literature in economics and 
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 marketing after Stigler (1968) can be considered a series of attempts to examine the 
relative optimality of the three bundling strategies (i.e., unbundling, pure bundling, and 
mixed bundling) under various assumptions and create more generally applicable 
principles.  Table 3 summarizes important studies in this stream.   
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 Table 3: Bundling Literature Concerning the Demand-side Rationales for 
Bundling 
 
Study Contributions and Findings 
Stigler (1968)  Widely believed to articulate this idea first using the 
famous example regarding “block booking” of movies.   
 Showed how bundling can increase sellers’ profits when 
consumer valuations for two goods are “negatively 
correlated” (i.e., one consumer values a product higher 
than another consumer, whereas the former values another 
product lower than the latter; for example, consumer 1 and 
2 in Table 1 have a higher reservation price for flight than 
consumer 3, whilst they have a lower reservation price for 
hotel than consumer 3).   
Adams and Yellen 
(1976) 
 Developed Sigler’s idea on a two-dimensional, 
diagrammatic “reservation price” space, and formally 
showed that bundling can increase profits if the valuations 
of the two goods are negatively correlated.   
 Assuming a multi-product monopolist, two goods, no 
resale among buyers, and independence in consumer 
reservation prices (i.e., the value of a bundle to customers 
is equal to the sum of the individual value of its 
components, also known as the additivity assumption)2, 
compared the optimality of three strategies. 
 Through numerous experiments covering a wide range of 
cost structures and customer reservation prices, found 
“some forms of” bundling to be more profitable than 
unbundling.   
Schmalensee (1984)  Assumed the distribution of reservation prices in the 
Adams-Yellen framework to be bivariate normal, all the 
other assumptions being equal, and showed that bundling 
facilitates more efficient extraction of consumers’ surplus 
by reducing the heterogeneity in their reservation prices.   
 Showed that pure bundling ca enhance profits even when 
consumers’ reservation prices are positively correlated, as 
long as they are not perfectly correlated.   
 Concluded that mixed bundling combines the advantages 
of pure bundling and unbundled sales, and it generally 
generates more profits than either: “This policy enables the 
seller to reduce effective heterogeneity among those 
buyers with high reservation prices for both goods, while 
still selling at a high markup to those buyers willing to pay 
a high price for only one of the goods.” (p. S229).   
(To be continued in the following page) 
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 (Continued from the previous page) 
Guiltinan (1987)  Relaxed two strict assumptions of previous economics 
literature, independence in consumer reservation prices 
(i.e., the additivity assumption) and monopoly, to consider 
the complementarity3 among products and market 
competition.   
 Provided four specific conditions under which each 
possible combination of bundling types (i.e., mixed-joint 
vs. mixed-leader)4 and firms’ objectives (i.e., cross-selling 
vs. new customer acquisition) are most likely to be 
successful.   
McAfee et al. (1989)  Investigated the demand conditions under which bundling 
is more profitable than unbundling in the Adams and 
Yellen (1976) model.  
 Demonstrated that mixed bundling dominates pure 
bundling and unbundling whenever reservation prices for 
various products are independently distributed among 
consumers.   
Salinger (1995)  Developed a graphical framework to analyze the 
profitability and welfare implications of pure bundling.   
 Explicitly considered cost saving effects, as well as 
demand effects, of bundling.   
 Affirmed the results of previous economics research (i.e., 
bundling is generally more profitable than unbundling 
when reservation prices are negatively correlated).  In 
addition, found that if bundling lowers costs, it tends to be 
more profitable when demands for the components are 
highly positively correlated and component costs are high.  
Bakos and 
Brynjolfsson (1999) 
 Considered the bundling of large numbers of information 
goods with zero or very low marginal cost.  
 Found that the profitability of bundling becomes greater 
when marginal costs of reproducing information goods are 
low or when customer valuations are negatively correlated.  
Stremersch and Tellis 
(2003) 
 Synthesizing the results of previous bundling literature, 
suggested 12 propositions that prescribe the optimal 
bundling strategy depending on five important factors: (1) 
consumers’ reservation prices; (2) objectives of the firm; 
(3) competition; (4) costs; and (5) consumer perceptions of 
bundles.   
 Suggested that price bundling (either pure or mixed) yields 
higher revenues than unbundling if conditional reservation 
prices for two products are negatively correlated across 
customers (proposition 1).   
 Proposed that mixed bundling dominates pure bundling 
only when reservation prices for the “bundle” vary across 
customers (proposition 2).   
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 Based on these previous studies, this paper concludes that, at least under some 
conditions, mixed bundling is superior to pure bundling and unbundling in increasing 
sellers’ profits.  The most important conditions for successful bundling seem to be 
either heterogeneity in consumer valuations for the products (either for the component 
products or the bundle) or cost savings resulting from bundling.  To the best knowledge 
of the author, there has been no formal research examining whether or not these 
conditions, especially the demand conditions, hold true in the online travel industry.  
However, the pervasive use of the mixed bundling strategy in the real world leads the 
author to presume that either demand conditions or cost conditions, or both, hold true.  
That is, some consumers might value hotel accommodation higher than air flight whilst 
some others value the flight higher than the accommodation (i.e., negatively correlated 
reservation prices for individual products).  Also, consumers might have quite different 
reservation prices for the same bundle of travel products.  In addition to these demand-
side rationales, cost reductions, which are caused by economies of scope and/or travel 
suppliers’ strategic motivation to sell off unsold travel products without harming the 
brands, leads the online travel agents to employ the mixed bundling strategy 
extensively.  
Optimal Pricing of a Bundle 
We can now understand why online travel agents offer travel “packages” as well 
as individual travel products and under what conditions mixed bundling is more 
profitable than either pure bundling or unbundling.  However, there remains a question 
regarding the pricing of a bundle.  That is, what prices should be set for a bundle and 
for its component products under mixed bundling?   
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 Most of the previously reviewed studies explicitly or implicitly assume that 
mixed bundling accompanies discounts.  Indeed, as Adams and Yellen (1976) 
acknowledge, the additivity assumption (i.e., independence in demand), which is very 
common in traditional economics bundling literature, makes mixed bundling a distinct 
strategy only if the price for a bundle is lower than the sum of the prices for its 
component products; otherwise, nobody would buy the bundle.  In addition, if bundling 
indeed brings about considerable cost savings and the market is competitive rather than 
monopolistic, firms will probably have strong motivation to offer discounts for bundled 
sales.   
However, there are at least two appealing reasons to doubt the idea that bundling 
is necessarily coupled with considerable discounts: complementarity among bundled 
products and consumer difficulty in evaluating the savings.  First, as Guiltinan (1987) 
stressed, consumers’ reservation prices for a bundle may exceed the sum of the 
reservation prices for the component products when the two products have a 
complementary relationship.  He identifies three possible sources of this complementary 
relationship: search economies (i.e., savings in customer time and effort), enhanced 
customer satisfaction, and improved total image or credibility of the seller.  Obviously, 
many customers will appreciate the convenience of booking several travel products in 
one place, and hence, may be willing to pay more for this convenience of one-stop 
shopping.  Second, as stated in the introduction, consumers may have difficulty in 
evaluating the relative savings purchasing a bundle yields.  If these conditions hold true, 
the price for a bundle might not represent a true monetary savings as generally 
advertised by firms or believed by consumers.   
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 Considering the prevalent use of bundling strategies, prior literature on the 
optimal bundle “pricing” is surprisingly scant.  Using mixed integer linear 
programming, Hanson and Martin (1987) provide a practical model for a profit-
maximizing monopolist to determine optimal bundle prices under a wide variety of cost 
and reservation price conditions.  However, the model does not provide more generally 
applicable insights into predicting bundle prices of travel products because it requires 
the exact data on customer reservation prices, through a case-specific questionnaire, as 
well as the actual cost data of a particular firm.   
Venkatesh and Mahajan (1993) develop a probabilistic model for determining 
optimal prices of a bundle and/or its component products under unbundling, pure 
bundling, and mixed bundling strategies.  They apply the model to pricing ten single 
music/dance performance tickets and the season ticket, which is in this case the bundle 
of the ten individual performances over a certain time period.  The results are consistent 
with the traditional view that mixed bundling yields more profits than the others.  The 
results also confirmed that mixed bundling generally occurs with considerable discounts 
on the bundle: the optimal prices were $14 for the single ticket and $55 for the season 
ticket.  However, this model did not consider complementary relationships among the 
products.  Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) develop another pricing model that 
considers the degree of complementarity or substitutability among products.  The model 
suggests that a bundle of complements be priced higher than a bundle of individually 
valued products under mixed bundling.5 
The study most similar to this paper is Estelami (1999).  Based on the same 
reasons as stated before (i.e., consumer difficulty in evaluating the savings and 
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 complementarity among bundled products), Estelami hypothesizes that sellers may not 
offer discounts but charge premiums for complementary bundles.  To test this 
hypothesis, he measured the magnitude of bundle savings for three product categories: 
fast food meals, photographic equipment, and personal computers.  The results show 
that consumers save about 8%, on average, by purchasing a bundle instead of 
purchasing its component products separately.  However, about 8.8% of all the 
observed bundles returned higher prices than the sum of the individual prices of the 
component products.  While there are some differences in terms of the frequency, from 
4% in fast-food meals to 12% in personal computers, this “bundle surcharge” occurred 
in all three product categories without exception.  Although this empirical study did not 
measure the prices of travel products, the results cast doubts on the common belief that 
purchasing travel products as a bundle returns significantly cheaper prices than 
purchasing the same products separately.  
Bundling Literature in the Travel Setting 
Given the prevalent use of price bundling in the travel industry, relatively little 
research has examined the subject in the hospitality and tourism context in particular.  
Kinberg and Sudit (1979)  developed an algorithm for the determination of 
appropriate bundle mix and bundle price in the international travel industry, both in the 
travel agency level (i.e., bundlings of air transportation and land-travel arrangements as 
well as bundlings of more than one international destinations) and on the resort level 
(i.e., mix of various recreational amenities and services).  The authors premised their 
algorithm on the assumption that “bundles of air transportation and land arrangements 
 19 
 
 (e.g., hotel accommodation or rent-a-car) are priced, as a rule, at least in the travel 
agency level, lower than the sum price of the individual components.”   
As reviewed earlier, there are two cornerstones for a price bundling strategy to 
be profitable: (1) the determination of consumer demand (i.e., reservation prices) on 
bundles and individual products as well, and (2) the identification of the costs of 
offering various bundles.  Stressing this point, Bojanic and Calantone (1990) presented 
a framework which derives consumer preferences (i.e., reservation prices) for varios 
individual products and bundles, using the technique of conjoint analysis, and forecasts 
the changes in sales volume associated with different combinations of individual 
products/services, using a logit choice model.  The profitability of alternative bundling 
strategies then can be determioned by combining the sales forecast with relevant costs 
of providing the various bundles and the prices at which the bundles may be offered.   
Naylor and Frank (2001) reported that some consumers prefer purchasing 
bundles of various travel services to purchasing the component products separately 
because doing so simplifies search and purchase decision processes.  In a longitudinal 
study conducted across first-time and repeat guests at an upscale resort/spa, the authors 
found that providing an all-inclusive package, even if actual monetary outlay was 
higher, would significantly increase perceptions of value for first-time consumers in 
particular.   
The studies cited in the preceding paragraphs are not specifically related to the 
subject of this paper.  However, each study has some parts demonstrating that the use of 
price bundling in the hospitality and travel setting does not contradict, at least in general, 
the theories and assumptions established in economics and marketing literature.   First, 
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 consumer reservation prices for individual travel products and bundles, along with the 
costs of providing the bundles, determine the optimal bundling strategy (i.e., whether or 
not to employ price bundling strategy, what bundles to provide, and what prices to set).  
More important, as assumed in most economics and marketing literature, travel bundles 
seem to be offered at discounted prices, compared with the sum of the individual prices 
of component products, while complementarity among bundled products might increase 
the prices of bundles.   
 
 21 
 
  22 
 
Notes 
 
 
1 For example, one stream of the explanations focuses on the relative contribution 
margin of different products.  This view argues that, if a firm’s products have high 
contribution margin ratios (i.e., the prices of the products are relatively higher than the 
variable costs), price bundling coupled with discounts can be an effective way to 
increase the profits.  Eppen et al. (1991) and Stremersch and Tellis (2002) illustrate this 
idea using similar examples as follows.  Suppose that a company considers offering a 
bundle of its two products, X and Y.  Let product X be sold for $100 and Y for $200, 
and the company price the bundle of X and Y at $270 (10% discount).  In this case, the 
effectiveness of price bundling depends on the extent product X and Y have 
contribution margins.  If both products have relatively low contribution margins, say, 
30% and 40% respectively, 10% discount for the bundle will require more than a 38% 
increase in demand to make the bundling more profitable than status quo.  By contrast, 
if both products have relatively high contribution margins, say, 70% and 80% 
respectively, a demand increase of only 15% will offset the profit loss due to the same 
10% discount for the bundle.  However, what this illustration indeed demonstrates is 
that discounts on high-margin products are better than discounts on low-margin 
products in increasing profits.  That is, it is still ambiguous why firms bundle their 
products rather than just discount the prices of individual high-margin products. 
 
2 This is one of common assumption in the economics literature.  Guiltinan (1987) 
called it the assumption of “strict additivity.” 
 
3 In contrast to the additivity assumption, complementarity means that the reservation 
price for the bundle exceeds the sum of the reservation prices for the component 
products because the perceived value of one product is increased if the other is 
purchased (Guiltinan, 1987).  
 
4 Implicitly assuming that mixed bundling is at least more profitable than pure bundling, 
Guiltinan (1987) entirely focused on the either form of mixed bundling: mixed-leader 
and mixed-joint.   
 
5 They computed component prices as percentages of the corresponding bundle prices.  
They also suggest charging higher prices (compared with those for independently 
valued products) for most substitutes as well as complements.  Because a consumer’s 
reservation price for a substitutive bundle is lower than the sum of the reservation prices 
for the component products, this suggestion is contrary to common belief.   
 CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESES, DATA, AND METHODOLOGY 
Hypotheses 
Bundle Savings Compared with Separate Purchasing within an Agent 
The primary objective of this paper is to examine whether purchasing travel 
bundles yields savings compared with purchasing the component products separately.  
As reviewed earlier, most bundling literature in economics and marketing suggests that 
mixed bundling accompany discounts.  Although the two factors, complementarity 
among bundled products and consumer difficulty in assessing the savings amounts, may 
negatively affect the amounts of consumer savings from bundling, there has been no 
conclusive evidence that these negative effects are large enough to cause bundle 
premium or surcharge.  Hence, this paper hypothesizes directionally (i.e., one-tailed 
tests) as follows:  
 
H1 (0): Within the same online travel agent’s website, there is no significant 
difference in the prices of travel products between purchasing them as 
a bundle and purchasing them separately.  
H1 (A): Within the same online travel agent’s website, purchasing a bundle 
yields significantly discounted prices than purchasing the component 
products separately.   
 
Bundle Savings Compared with Separate Purchasing from Suppliers 
Most travel bundles are offered by travel agents, which, as an intermediary, can 
create a wide variety of bundles by combining different types of travel products.  In 
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 contrast, “separate purchasing (i.e., unbundling)” can also occur when consumers 
purchase more than one travel products directly from the suppliers’ own websites.  
Therefore, bundle savings at online travel agents’ websites can be measured in 
comparison to the sum of the prices consumers pay for purchasing the same component 
products at each supplier’s own website.  As in the first hypotheses, there has been no 
theoretical or empirical evidence that separate purchasing from individual suppliers 
yields greater savings than purchasing them as a bundle from online travel agents.  
Therefore, following the prevalent assumption of most bundling literature, this paper 
predicts that purchasing a travel bundle from online travel agents yields cheaper prices 
even compared with purchasing the same component products separately from the 
suppliers.   
 
H2 (0):  There is no significant difference in the online prices of travel 
products between purchasing them as a bundle from online travel 
agents and separately from the suppliers’ own websites.   
H2 (A):  Purchasing a travel bundle from online travel agents yields 
significantly discounted prices than purchasing the component 
products separately from the sellers’ own websites.   
 
Difference in the Magnitude of Bundle Savings Between Online Travel Agents 
This paper also expects that the amounts of bundle savings, measured within an 
agent, will vary by online travel agents.  In other words, the test results of H1 and H2  
may not be similar between different online travel agents.  Setting prices for indivisual 
travel products and bundles, and thereby deciding how much monetary discounts to 
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 offer to consumers, is to a great extent a travel agent’s strategic decision.  In addition, 
suppliers may provide a travel product to an agent at a cheaper price than to other 
agents, depending on, for example, the market share or bargaining power of the agents.  
This paper tests this idea using the following hypothesis.  Because there is no sufficient 
reason to expect one of the two online travel agents will offer significantly greater 
bundle discounts than the other, two-tailed tests are used.   
 
H3 (0):  There is no significant difference in the magnitude of bundle savings 
between online travel agents.  
H3 (A):  There is significant difference in the magnitude of bundle savings 
between online travel agents.  
 
Travel Attributes Affecting the Level of Bundle Savings 
The last objective of this paper is to investigate whether bundle savings vary 
depending on the attributes of products included in a travel bundle.  Three relevant 
attributes are selected as follows: (1) destination city, (2) hotel class (i.e., segment), and 
(3) the timing of purchase (i.e., how far in advance a bundle is purchased).   
 
H4 (0):  There is no significant difference in the bundle savings between two 
destination cities (i.e., Orlando and San Antonio).   
H4 (A):  There is significant difference in the bundle savings between two 
destination cities (i.e., Orlando and San Antonio).   
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 Both cities are large and have major hotel chains.  However, Orlando has a 
higher volume of tourists and more hotels per capita.  This might result in a more 
competitive market and more discounts in Orlando, especially during the lower demand 
(i.e., non peak) travel periods.  However, little has been demonstrated about the 
differences in the two travel markets.  Thus, this paper uses two-tailed hypotheses.   
 
H5 (0):  There is no significant difference in the bundle savings between 
lower-class hotels and upper-class hotels.   
H5 (A):  There is significant difference in the bundle savings between lower-
class hotels and upper-class hotels.   
 
Lower-class hotels and upper-class hotels probably face different demand and 
cost conditions, thereby behaving differently in the use of price bundling strategy.  It is 
uncertain how the different demand conditions affect the amount of bundle discounts.  
As to the cost condition, yet,  more expensive hotels might have higher profit margins 
and therefore are likely to provide more latitude for a larger absolute discounts, even 
though the percentage discounts might not differ.  As in Hypothesis 4, yet, two-tailed 
hypotheses were constructed because little has been known about the relationship 
between hotel class and the amounts of bundle discounts.   
Last, as to the effect of purchase timing, the author expects there might be more 
potential for savings the earlier you book a travel package (hotel’s occupancy would be 
less, the further ahead).  However, yield management procedures would result in price 
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 changes throughout the cycle and we could see movement in both directions based on 
actual pickup vs. historical pickup.   
 
H6 (0):  There is no significant difference in the bundle savings among 
different timings of purchase (i.e., 1 month, 3 months, and 6 months 
ahead of departure).  
H6 (A):  There is significant difference in the bundle savings among different 
timings of purchase.   
 
Data Sources and Collection Methods 
To test the proposed hypotheses, this paper observed the prices of 239 travel 
bundles, 119 from Expedia and 120 from Travelocity.  For each travel bundle, two 
types of unbundled prices (i.e., one within the same agent, and the other from the 
suppliers’ own websites) were also recorded, then the magnitudes of within-agent 
savings and versus-supplier savings were calculated.   
Three relevant prices for a travel bundle (i.e., bundled price, unbundled price 
within the same travel agent, unbundled price from suppliers’ own online reservation 
sites) were collected  virtually spontaneously to avoid any possible price changes due to 
systematic price changes based on demand and supply.  For the same reason, all prices 
for a specific timing of purchase were collected approximately within the same week, in 
the order of one-month, three-months, and six-months advanced booking.  In addition, 
the pace of data collection was matched across the two online travel agents.  The data 
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 collection occurred during the first three weeks in July 2007.  More details of the data 
and the collection procedures are presented in the following sections.   
Online Travel Agent 
The travel bundles in the sample were chosen from two market-leading online 
travel agents, Expedia and Travelocity.  According to Mintel Report (2005), Expedia 
was the largest (41.2%) and Travelocity was the second largest (19.6%) pure-play 
online travel agent, based on the number of bookings for 2004.  Despite auction-style 
online travel agents (e.g., Priceline) have been becoming more important in online 
travel markets, this paper excludes them.  Such firms allow consumers to name their 
own price, and the final price remains opaque until the bid is accepted.  Obviously, 
prices obtained through this process are not directly comparable to those offered by 
typical online travel agents or suppliers.   
Origin 
This paper used the same origin, Chicago O’Hare Airport, for the two 
destination cities.  Chicago O’Hare Airport is one of the biggest airports in the nation 
and is believed to provide comprehensive flight schedules to both Orlando and San 
Antonio.  In addition, the distances from Chicago to both destination cities are almost 
the same (i.e., approximately 2 hours and 40 minates when using a non-stop flight), 
therefore not affecting the magnitude of bundle savings by destination.   
Duration of a Travel 
The duration of a travel was set into 7 nights starting from a Sturday (i.e., 
Saturday to the next Saturday) for all travel bundles in the sample.  For example, if 
prices were observed on July 7th, the nearest Saturday from August 7th was chosen to 
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 be a departing date for 1-month advanced booking.  Hotels and airlines usually set 
considerably different prices between weekday and weekend reservations, and this 
practice could affect the amount of bundle discounts.  7 nights starting from a Saturday 
eliminate the bias due to this pricing practice.  Also, it is the most popular length of 
time for Disney vacations.   
Hotel Class 
Expedia and Travelocity use slightly different star-rating systems.  In order to 
compare bundle savings by hotel class, it is necessary to apply an identical 
classification method to the “hotel + flight” bundles selected from different travel 
agents.  Although a number of different hotel classification methods are employed in 
hospitality literature and in the industry (e.g., O’Connor, 2003; O’Neill, 2003), most of 
them focus on rating hotel chains, rather than a specific property, and do not provide 
ratings for independent hotels.  For this reason, this paper followed Expedia’s ratings, 
which classifies all properties listed into 9 segments (i.e., 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4, 4.5, 
5).  The class of hotels selected from Travelocity was adjusted according to the 
classification provided by Expedia.  Lower-class hotels in hypothesis 4 were chosen 
from 2.5 star and 2 star segments, whereas upper-class hotels were mostly chosen from 
4 star and higher segments (a few 3.5 star hotels were included in the sample to 
acquire minimum number of observations).   
Selection of Flights 
When building a travel bundle, this paper only specified origin and destination 
airports (i.e., from Chicago to either Orlando or San Antonio), departing and returning 
dates, and the number of travelers (i.e., one adult).  That is, other important 
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 information about flights (e.g., departing and returning times, carriers, class of seats, 
number of stops, etc.) was not specified.  Then, the flights the agents suggest as the 
first choice for the bundle were accepted as they are without additional modification.  
This is because pilot data indicated that the travel agents normally suggest from the 
cheapest available tickets and provide the lowest number of transfers possible at the 
lowest price.  If so, at least as to the research hypotheses of this study, there is no 
reason to modify the suggested flights intentionally.   
However, some complex flights, which include more than one carriers for a 
single flight, had to be replaced with simpler flights because purchasing the 
component flights separately from each airline’s online reservation site and summing 
up the individual fares sometimes returned abnormally higher prices than purchasing 
the same flights separately from the travel agents.  When replacing a complex flight, 
this paper always considered from the second alternatives the travel agents suggested.   
Selection of a Travel Bundle and Record of Prices 
For every possible combination of destination, departing date and returning date, 
and hotel class, prices of 10 “flight + hotel” bundles were collected.  The bundles were 
selected from the top of the recommendation lists provided by the agents (i.e., Expedia 
Picks and Travelocity Picks), based on the assumption that the agents present the most 
aluable bundles first and consumers normally browse from the top of the first pages.   
However, some bundles, whose separate prices could not be collected from the 
suppliers, were excluded from the sample.  For example, several independent hotels 
did not have their own online reservation site.  Sometimes the same types of rooms 
and rates selected for a bundle at an agent’s website were not available at suppliers’ 
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 own reservation websites, hence making it unreasonable to compare the bundle price 
with the unbindled price.   
All other identifiable attributes of a travel bundle (e.g., room type, carriers, seat 
class, departure and arrival times, restrictions on tickets, etc.) were perfectly matched 
across the relevant purchases from agents and suppliers.  Also, special attention has 
been given to prices to make sure that the prices are all-inclusive of associated taxes 
and fees.   
Data Structure 
Table 4 shows the structure of data and the number of observations in each 
condition.  As indicated in the table, the grand total number of observations becomes 
717 (one travel bundle purchased at Expedia for San Antonio, upper-class hotels, and 6-
month advanced booking was excluded because the unbundled price from the suppliers 
were abnormally higher than the bundled price and unbundled price from Expedia).   
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Table 4: Data Structure and the Number of Observations 
 
Timing of Purchase Agent Bundling Destination Hotel 
Segment 1 Month 3 Months 6 Months 
Expedia Bundling Orlando Lower 10 10 10 
   Upper 10 10 10 
  San Antonio Lower 10 10 10 
   Upper 10 10 9 
 Unbundling Orlando Lower 10 10 10 
 (Agent)  Upper 10 10 10 
  San Antonio Lower 10 10 10 
   Upper 10 10 9 
 Unbundling Orlando Lower 10 10 10 
 (Suppliers)  Upper 10 10 10 
  San Antonio Lower 10 10 10 
   Upper 10 10 9 
Travelocity Bundling Orlando Lower 10 10 10 
   Upper 10 10 10 
  San Antonio Lower 10 10 10 
   Upper 10 10 10 
 Unbundling Orlando Lower 10 10 10 
 (Agent)  Upper 10 10 10 
  San Antonio Lower 10 10 10 
   Upper 10 10 10 
 Unbundling Orlando Lower 10 10 10 
 (Suppliers)  Upper 10 10 10 
  San Antonio Lower 10 10 10 
   Upper 10 10 10 
    240 240 237 
 
 
 CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Bundle Savings Compared with Separate Purchasing within an Agency 
For all travel bundles collected in the sample (119 from Expedia and 120 from 
Travelocity), both agents quoted discounted prices compared with the prices of separate 
purchasing within the same agent.   
Independent samples t tests were conducted to determine whether purchasing 
two travel products as a bundle at an online travel agent results in significant discounts 
compared with purchasing the same products separately from the same agent.  Table 5 
and 6 show that the results were different by agent.  Travelocity returned significantly 
lower prices for all tested combinations of hotel class and timing of purchase.  Expedia, 
by contrast, did not necessarily return significant bundle discounts; the amount of 
discounts was significant only for the two conditions out of six tested.  
Table 5: Bundle Savings Within An Agent (Expedia) 
 
Description Mean Price (USD) 
Std. 
Deviation t 
p-Value 
(1-tailed)
Bundled 712.69 134.71 Lower-class hotel & 
1-month advanced purchase Unbundled 823.45 211.87 -1.973 .028* 
Bundled 1,453.90 381.31 Upper-class hotel & 
1-month advanced purchase Unbundled 1,638.35 446.20 -1.405 .084 
Bundled 706.78 163.47 Lower-class hotel & 
3-month advanced purchase Unbundled 802.99 231.41 -1.519 .069 
Bundled 1,979.56 355.96 Upper-class hotel & 
3-month advanced purchase Unbundled 2,265.42 383.91 -2.442 .010* 
Bundled 857.30 230.29 Lower-class hotel & 
6-month advanced purchase Unbundled 920.21 285.92 -.766 .224 
Bundled 2,167.87 668.08 Upper-class hotel & 
6-month advanced purchase Unbundled 2,317.50 666.73 -.691 .247 
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 Table 6: Bundle Savings Within An Agent (Travelocity) 
 
Description Mean Price (USD) 
Std. 
Deviation t 
p-Value 
(1-tailed)
Bundled 707.71 134.52 Lower-class hotel & 
1-month advanced purchase Unbundled 844.61 210.16 -2.454 .009* 
Bundled 1,451.14 405.30 Upper-class hotel & 
1-month advanced purchase Unbundled 1,766.48 494.09 -2.207 .017* 
Bundled 673.73 158.02 Lower-class hotel & 
3-month advanced purchase Unbundled 823.50 230.63 -2.396 .011* 
Bundled 1,786.21 423.50 Upper-class hotel & 
3-month advanced purchase Unbundled 2,298.29 401.34 -3.925 .000* 
Bundled 763.34 211.00 Lower-class hotel & 
6-month advanced purchase Unbundled 914.12 247.70 -2.072 .023* 
Bundled 2,009.53 711.25 Upper-class hotel & 
6-month advanced purchase Unbundled 2,443.43 844.43 -1.762 .043* 
 
 
Bundle Savings Compared with Separate Purchasing from Suppliers 
The results showed that the prices of purchasing a travel bundle from a travel 
agent are not necessarily lower than the prices of purchasing the component products 
individually from each supplier.  Thirty-seven bundles out of 119  (31.1%) at Expedia 
did not beat the supplier prices, while 17 bundles out of 120 (14.2%) at Travelocity 
returned prices higher than the supplier prices.   
Independent samples t tests were used to determine whether there is significant 
difference in the prices of travel products between purchasing them as a bundle from an 
online travel agent and purchasing them separately from suppliers.  The results were 
similar in H1.  As shown in Table 7 and 8, Travelocity returned significant bundle 
discounts for 3-month advanced purchase, both for lower-class and upper-class hotels, 
whereas Expedia failed to return significant bundle discounts for all combinations of 
hotel class and timing of purchase.   
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 Table 7. Bundle Savings Versus Suppliers (Expedia) 
 
Description Mean Price (USD) 
Std. 
Deviation t 
p-Value 
(1-tailed)
Bundled 712.68 134.71 Lower-class hotel & 
1-month advanced purchase Unbundled 758.12 190.44 -.871 .195 
Bundled 1,453.90 381.31 Upper-class hotel & 
1-month advanced purchase Unbundled 1,652.75 452.24 -1.503 .071 
Bundled 706.78 163.47 Lower-class hotel & 
3-month advanced purchase Unbundled 782.97 223.19 -1.232 .113 
Bundled 1,979.56 355.96 Upper-class hotel & 
3-month advanced purchase Unbundled 2,165.33 401.05 -1.549 .065 
Bundled 857.30 230.29 Lower-class hotel & 
6-month advanced purchase Unbundled 877.91 279.27 -.255 .400 
Bundled 2,167.87 668.08 Upper-class hotel & 
6-month advanced purchase Unbundled 2,245.02 628.85 -.367 .358 
* Unbundled price here means the sum of the prices of purchasing the component 
products individually from each supplier’s own website.   
 
Table 8: Bundle Savings Versus Suppliers (Travelocity) 
 
Description Mean Price (USD) 
Std. 
Deviation t 
p-Value 
(1-tailed)
Bundled 707.71 134.52 Lower-class hotel & 
1-month advanced purchase Unbundled 778.08 146.76 -1.581 .061 
Bundled 1,451.14 405.30 Upper-class hotel & 
1-month advanced purchase Unbundled 1,650.02 481.47 -1.413 .083 
Bundled 673.73 158.02 Lower-class hotel & 
3-month advanced purchase Unbundled 792.79 221.82 -1.955 .029* 
Bundled 1,786.21 423.50 Upper-class hotel & 
3-month advanced purchase Unbundled 2,200.15 437.24 -3.041 .002* 
Bundled 763.34 211.00 Lower-class hotel & 
6-month advanced purchase Unbundled 871.61 236.73 -1.527 .068 
Bundled 2,009.53 711.25 Upper-class hotel & 
6-month advanced purchase Unbundled 2,271.30 559.24 -1.294 .102 
 
 
Difference in the Magnitude of Bundle Savings Between Online Travel Agents 
To compare the average bundle savings offered by Expedia and Travelocity 
(i.e., the savings measured in comparison with a separate purchase within the same 
agent), independent samples t tests were conducted.  As expected from the results of the 
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 first two hypotheses tests, these tests demonstrated that there were significant 
differences in the bundle savings offered by the two online travel agents, at least under 
some conditions.   
Table 9 and 10 show that Travelocity tends to offer significantly greater bundle 
discounts than Expedia, both measured in absolute and percentage terms.  In particular, 
it seems that the further in advance a travel bundle is purchased, the greater is the 
amount of the difference between the two agents.  In other words, there was no 
significant difference in the magnitude of bundle discounts provided for one-month 
advanced purchases whether it is measured in absolute or percentage terms.   
Table 9: Absolute Bundle Savings* by Agent 
 
Description Mean Savings (USD) 
Std. 
Deviation t 
p-Value 
(2-tailed)
Expedia 110.76 114.97 Lower-class hotel & 
1-month advanced purchase Travelocity 136.90 103.19 -.757 .454 
Expedia 184.44 163.36 Upper-class hotel & 
1-month advanced purchase Travelocity 315.34 250.17 -1.959 .057 
Expedia 96.21 95.11 Lower-class hotel & 
3-month advanced purchase Travelocity 149.77 114.40 -1.610 .116 
Expedia 285.86 335.14 Upper-class hotel & 
3-month advanced purchase Travelocity 512.08 400.00 -1.939 .060 
Expedia 62.92 78.09 Lower-class hotel & 
6-month advanced purchase Travelocity 150.79 108.36 -2.942 .006* 
Expedia 149.63 150.82 Upper-class hotel & 
6-month advanced purchase Travelocity 440.33 301.34 -3.778 .001* 
* Bundle savings here and in Table 10 means the savings in  comparison with 
purchasing the component products individually from the same agent.   
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 Table 10:  Percentage Bundle Savings* by Agent 
 
Description Mean Savings (%) 
Std. 
Deviation t 
p-Value 
(2-tailed)
Expedia 12.19 8.65 Lower-class hotel & 
1-month advanced purchase Travelocity 15.02 8.04 -1.072 .290 
Expedia 10.64 9.18 Upper-class hotel & 
1-month advanced purchase Travelocity 16.69 11.73 -1.818 .077 
Expedia 10.87 7.81 Lower-class hotel & 
3-month advanced purchase Travelocity 17.26 8.39 -2.495 .017* 
Expedia 11.75 12.45 Upper-class hotel & 
3-month advanced purchase Travelocity 21.65 15.01 -2.270 .029* 
Expedia 5.75 5.70 Lower-class hotel & 
6-month advanced purchase Travelocity 15.91 10.53 -3.794 .001* 
Expedia 6.51 6.44 Upper-class hotel & 
6-month advanced purchase Travelocity 17.84 9.95 -4.199 .000* 
* Bundle savings here means the savings in comparison with purchasing the component 
products individually from the same agent.   
 
 
Bundle Savings by Destination 
The effect of destination on bundle savings was tested using independent 
samples t tests.  As seen in Table 11 and 12, the two destinations differed significantly, 
at least under some conditions, in yielding bundle savings.  Orlando produced 
significantly greater bundle savings for one-month and three-month advanced purchases, 
while San Antonio produced greater bundle savings for six-month advanced purchse.  
Although not throughly incorporated into the hypothesis, the seasonality of the 
destination cities seems to result in these differences.  Orlando hotels may have 
relatively strong demand in winter, therefore they do not provide as much bundle 
discounts as in the other seasons.   
In addition, it is noticeable that these significant differences were observed only 
in the lower-class hotel sectors.  As shown in the tables, the bundle savings provided by 
upper-class hotels were not different between the two destination cities. 
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Table 11: Absolute Bundle Savings by Destination 
 
Description Mean Savings (USD) 
Std. 
Deviation t 
p-Value 
(2-tailed)
Orlando 159.47 138.16 Lower-class hotel & 
1-month advanced purchase San Antonio 88.19 49.63 2.171 .036* 
Orlando 227.30 234.51 Upper-class hotel & 
1-month advanced purchase San Antonio 272.49 205.47 -.648 .521 
Orlando 160.05 137.50 Lower-class hotel & 
3-month advanced purchase San Antonio 85.93 42.96 2.301 .027* 
Orlando 392.95 470.40 Upper-class hotel & 
3-month advanced purchase San Antonio 404.99 279.09 -.098 .922 
Orlando 74.21 81.99 Lower-class hotel & 
6-month advanced purchase San Antonio 139.49 113.74 -2.082 .044* 
Orlando 284.38 318.22 Upper-class hotel & 
6-month advanced purchase San Antonio 313.79 238.72 -.325 .747 
 
 
Table 12: Percentage Bundle Savings by Destination 
 
Description Mean Savings (%) 
Std. 
Deviation t 
p-Value 
(2-tailed)
Orlando 16.26 9.75 Lower-class hotel & 
1-month advanced purchase San Antonio 10.95 5.80 2.092 .043* 
Orlando 13.53 12.60 Upper-class hotel & 
1-month advanced purchase San Antonio 13.80 9.07 -.077 .939 
Orlando 16.65 10.17 Lower-class hotel & 
3-month advanced purchase San Antonio 11.48 5.94 1.961 .057 
Orlando 17.14 18.06 Upper-class hotel & 
3-month advanced purchase San Antonio 16.25 10.26 .192 .849 
Orlando 7.55 6.90 Lower-class hotel & 
6-month advanced purchase San Antonio 14.11 11.29 -2.217 .033* 
Orlando 10.42 10.10 Upper-class hotel & 
6-month advanced purchase San Antonio 14.32 9.98 -1.212 .233 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 38 
 
 Bundle Savings by Hotel Segment  
The effect of hotel segment on bundle discounts was tested using independent 
samples t tests.  As expected in the hypotheses, the results differed depending on 
whether the discount was measured in absolute amount or percentage amount (See 
Table 13 and 14).  When measured in absolute amount, bundles including an upper-
class hotel provide significantly greater discounts than bundles including a lower-class 
hotel.  In terms of percentage savings, however,  there was no significant difference in 
the magnitude of bundle savings between the two classes.  
 
Table 13: Absolute Bundle Savings by Hotel Class 
 
Description Mean Savings (USD) 
Std. 
Deviation t 
p-Value 
(2-tailed)
Lower-class 123.83 108.64 One-month  
advanced purchase Upper-class 249.89 218.83 3.263 .002* 
Lower-class 122.99 107.33 Three-month  
advanced purchase Upper-class 398.97 381.82 4.401 .000* 
Lower-class 106.85 103.30 Six-month  
advanced purchase Upper-class 298.71 279.01 4.073 .000* 
 
Table 14: Percentage Bundle Savings by Hotel Class 
 
Description Mean Savings (%) 
Std. 
Deviation t 
p-Value 
(2-tailed)
Lower-class 13.61 10.84 One-month  
advanced purchase Upper-class 13.66 8.36 .026 .979 
Lower-class 14.07 8.63 Three-month  
advanced purchase Upper-class 16.70 14.51 .986 .327 
Lower-class 10.83 9.82 Six-month  
advanced purchase Upper-class 12.32 10.10 .663 .509 
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 Bundle Savings by Timing of Purchase 
An one-way ANOVA was used to assess the impact of three timings of purchase 
on the magnitude of absolute and percentage bundle savings.  As presented in Table 15 
and 16, the results failed to support the hypothesis that bundle savings vary significantly 
in relation to how far in advance a travel is booked.   
Although the relationship between the timing of purchase and bundle savings 
was not significant, it would be an invalid argument to say that there are no differences 
in bundle savings among different timings of purchase.  This is because some factors 
other than the timing of purchase may have affected the results, in different directions 
and magnitudes, thereby making it impossible to observe solely the effect of the timing 
on bundle savings.  If the timing of purchase has been effectively decoupled from other 
potential determinants of bundle savings, the results might have suggested significant 
differences.   
Table 15: Absolute Bundle Savings by Timing of Purchase 
 
Description Mean Savings (USD) 
Std.  
Deviation F p-Value 
Lower-class hotel & 
1-month advanced purchase 123.83 108.64 
Lower-class hotel & 
3-month advanced purchase 122.99 107.33 
Lower-class hotel & 
6-month advanced purchase 106.85 103.30 
.323 .724 
Upper-class hotel & 
1-month advanced purchase 249.89 218.83 
Upper-class hotel & 
3-month advanced purchase 398.97 381.82 
Upper-class hotel & 
6-month advanced purchase 298.71 279.01 
2.548 .083 
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Table 16: Percentage Bundle Savings by Timing of Purchase 
 
Description Mean Savings (%) 
Std.  
Deviation F p-Value 
Lower-class hotel & 
1-month advanced purchase 13.61 8.36 
Lower-class hotel & 
3-month advanced purchase 14.07 8.63 
Lower-class hotel & 
6-month advanced purchase 10.83 9.82 
1.525 .222 
Upper-class hotel & 
1-month advanced purchase 13.66 10.84 
Upper-class hotel & 
3-month advanced purchase 16.70 14.51 
Upper-class hotel & 
6-month advanced purchase 12.32 10.10 
1.387 .254 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
Overall, the results of this exploratory study support the hypothesis that mixed 
price bundling in the online travel market is normally presented with actual monetary 
savings on bundle purchases.  This paper also investigated whether the magnitude of 
bundle discounts vary by four relevant variables such as travel agent, destination city, 
hotel class, and the timing of purchase.  The results demonstrate that at least the first 
three variables have significant relationships with the magnitude of bundle discounts 
provided to customers.   
These findings has several important implications for price bundling 
implemented in online travel markets.  First, although a couple of factors (i.e., the 
complementary relationship between bundled products and consumer difficulty in 
assessing the actual amount of bundle discounts) may increase the consumer value of 
purchasing a travel bundle, these effects seem not substantial enough to result in actual 
bundle “premiums.”  As a result, consumers can achieve actual monetary savings, 
although the amount may vary case by case, by purchasing a travel bundle instead of 
purchasing the component products individually from the same agent or the suppliers’ 
own websites.   
Next, the results suggest significant differences in the use of price bundling 
between the two online travel agents, Expedia and Travelocity.  In general, Travelocity 
seems to implement price bundling more extensively than Expedia, providing greater 
consumer savings for wider array of travel bundles.  It would be worth investigating in 
future research what factors result in this difference.  Based on the prior bundling 
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 literature (e.g., Guiltinan, 1987), one might hypothesize that Expedia is superior to 
Travelocity in creating and presenting the complementary relationships between 
bundled products, thereby being capable of selling even the same travel bundles with 
relatively moderate discounts than its competitors.  Alternatively, one might conjecture 
that the differences of travel agents in terms of market presence or market share 
empower (or urge) a travel agent to employ price bundling in different ways.   
As to the effects of travel attributes on the magnitude of bundle savings, the 
results suggest that the amounts of bundle savings are likely to vary by destination and 
hotel class.  In particular, the results indicate that travel bundles including upper-class 
hotels tend to provide significantly greater “absolute” savings than bundles including 
lower-class hotels.  Given that the percentage savings do not differ significantly by 
hotel class, the author conjecture that hotel firms and/or travel agents are simply 
applying similar discount rates to all types of their bundles.  If this is the case, the firms, 
especially online travel agents, need to conduct research on consumer demand (i.e., 
reservation prices for individual products and bundles).  Based on the information about 
the distribution of consumer reservation prices for their individual products and bundles, 
the firms could enhance the profitability of bundling strategy by applying different 
discount rates to each segment.   
As an exploratory study, this paper has several limitations that future research 
could address.  First, the independent variables in this study has very limited number of 
values.  In other words, the price data (i.e., dependent variables) ware collected from 
only two online travel agents, for two destinations, for two hotel classes, and for three 
timings of purchase.  As a result, generalizing the results into the entire online travel 
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industry may not be valid.  For example, the results failed to find significant differences 
in bundle savings among three different timings of purchase.  However, if one tests the 
same hypotheses for different time frames of purchasing (e.g., last minute or two weeks 
ahead of departure), the results might indicate significant differences.  Therefore, a 
natural extension of this study will be one that examines similar hypotheses for more 
various combinations of relevant independent variables, using sufficient numner of 
observations for each condition.   
One additional limitation of this study is that some other important variables, 
which probably have significant influences on bundle savings offered at a specific time 
for a specific destination, were not incorporated into or controlled by the tests.  For 
instance, seasonality of a destination may affect the bundle savings by  timing of 
purchase as well as by destination city.  Because seasonality is generally destination-
specific and often difficult to quantify, controlling or including the seasonal effects 
explicitly in the test should be challenging but worthwhile.   
This paper documented theoretical rationales that can explain the prevalent use 
of price bundling in the online travel industry.  In addition, it has been examined 
whether travel bundles are presented to consumers with actual monetary savings as 
commonly believed or advertised, and whether the magnitude of the savings varys by 
some relevant attributes of travel.  Lastly, this paper has presented several important 
implications and limitations of the findings, along with suggestions for future research.  
The author hopes this study stimulates more advanced research and helps travel firms 
make better decisions in offering and pricing their travel bundles.   
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